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This paper describes approaches to the measurement and explanation of income-related 
inequality and inequity in health care financing, health care utilization and health and 
considers the applicability and the feasibility of these methods in low-income countries. 
Results from a comparative study of 14 Asian countries are used to illustrate the main 
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the distribution of contributions to pre-payment mechanisms but with the deterrent 
effect of payments on utilization and the distribution of uninsured payment risks. 
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for need. Nonetheless, sufficient is known of the distribution of need in many 
circumstances in order to make inferences about equity from inequality in health care 
use. The empirical analyses demonstrate that, in low-income countries, the better-off 
tend to pay more for health care, both absolutely and in relative terms. But they also 
consume more health care. Health care is financed is largely according to the benefit 
principle. Assessing the distributional performance of health systems in low-income 
settings therefore requires examination of finance and utilization simultaneously. 
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1 Introduction 
It has been argued that in matters of health and health care, the public attaches greater 
importance to the achievement of equity than to efficiency (MacLachlan and Maynard 
1982). Whether this is true or not can be debated but even if it is not given primary 
importance, health equity is certainly a goal that attracts strong support in many 
countries. This is beginning to be reflected in academic research. Recent decades have 
witnessed a dramatic expansion of the literature on health equity. Not only has the 
number of articles with the word ‘equity’ in the abstract grown rapidly, but their share 
of all articles published in Medline, for instance, has grown by 260 per cent in the last 
25 years (O’Donnell et al. 2007b). Various factors have contributed to this 
development. An increased interest and awareness among international organizations, 
governments and NGOs worldwide is certainly one factor. But the increased availability 
of micro datasets and the development of new analytic methods also must have played 
an important role.  
 
In the health economics literature, the work on the measurement and explanation of 
inequalities in health and health care has drawn a lot on analogies with the literature on 
the measurement of inequalities in, and the redistribution of, income. Wagstaff and van 
Doorslaer (2000a) reviewed this literature until 2000 with respect to three key topics: 
equity in health care finance, equity in health care delivery, and inequalities in health. 
The focus was exclusively on income-related inequality and inequity in finance, 
utilization and health using measures that derive from egalitarian-based concepts of 
equity which were at the heart of the development of most health care systems in OECD 
countries. As a result, all inequity analyses proposed and used draw heavily on rank-
based measures of inequality, such as concentration curves and indices. Measurement 
methods for tax progressivity and income redistribution from the public finance 
literature could be used without much adaptation to analyze health care finance. 
Concentration curves and indices also proved very useful for the analysis of health 
inequality and, with some elaboration to take account of variation in need, of inequity in 
health care utilization. These methods were widely used for comparisons both within 
and across countries of the extent to which health care systems were achieving their 
egalitarian goals with respect to health finance (e.g. Wagstaff et al. 1999), health care 
delivery (e.g. van Doorslaer et al. 2000) and population health (e.g. van Doorslaer et al. 
1997). While these analyses undoubtedly provided useful comparative descriptive 
information to the policy debates in OECD countries, invariably they all referred to 
high-income countries, with health care systems that typically had (nearly) universal 
coverage of their (relatively homogeneous) populations for a fairly comprehensive 
package of services.  
In recent years, attempts have been made to apply similar methods to the analysis of 
health equity in low-income countries, which typically lack breadth of coverage with 
respect to both population and services. Some of the methods that have proved fruitful 
for the examination of equity in the finance and delivery of OECD health systems 
appear to be almost directly transferable to low-income contexts. But in other cases 
conceptual and/or practical considerations make the methods less suited to the analysis 
of the primary health equity issues of low-income countries. In this paper we aim to 2 
review what we have learned from a recently completed large-scale cross-country 
comparative research project about health equity and the challenges of analyzing it in 
low-income countries. The EQUITAP Project on equity in the finance and delivery of 
health care in the Asian-Pacific Region (www.equitap.org), was funded by the European 
Union as a research collaboration between two European and fourteen Asian research 
teams with the explicit aim to see to what extent the methods developed for the analysis 
of equity in European health care systems could provide similarly useful information for 
the equity comparison of Asian-Pacific health systems. 
For each of three distributions relevant to equity analysis—health payments, health care 
utilization and health status—we will review briefly (a) the standard measurement 
approach, (b) the required adaptation or qualification for the analysis of equity in low-
income settings and (c) the findings derived to date in the Asian comparisons. The 
concern about these three distributions derives mostly from the widely perceived social 
aversion to inequality in the distributions of both health and income. A social welfare 
function in which welfare is rising with the means of health and income and falling with 
their variances might be appealing to many. Consistent with this position, some have 
argued for analysis of all health inequality, just as for income inequality (Gakidou et al. 
2000). A less demanding concept of social justice recognizes that much of the variation 
in health is a matter of luck but takes exception to health disparities that derive from 
social, economic or ethnic status. Income-related inequality in health, for example, may 
be interpreted as inconsistent with the principle that all have an equal right to a long and 
healthy life. From this perspective, equity concerns about the distribution of health care 
by income derive from the more fundamental concern about the distribution of health by 
income, which they are expected to influence. Equity concerns about the distribution of 
health care payments by income are partly derived from concerns about how this affects 
the distribution of health care, and consequently health, but also, and importantly, 
because they affect the distribution of income. So, the distribution of income is not 
always only of instrumental interest to health sector equity. Sometimes it is the 
distribution of fundamental interest and the equity concern is about how the health 
sector impact on it. In what follows, we aim to make this clearer using some examples 
taken from the Asian comparative study. We start with a discussion of the distributional 
consequences of health care payments in Section 2. Section 3 discusses equity analyses 
of the distribution of health care utilization while Section 4 addresses the measurement 
and explanation of health inequality. Section 5 provides conclusions and a discussion.  
2  The distribution of health care payments  
The analysis of equity in the finance of health care has traditionally focused on the 
measurement of progressivity (Wagstaff et al. 1992; Wagstaff et al. 1999) and the 
income redistributive effect (van Doorslaer et al. 1999) of health sources in high-income 
countries. The main motivation was to determine the extent to which alternative 
financing mechanisms complied with the ability to pay principle. Progressivity analysis 
was used to measure vertical equity, i.e. the extent to which those with unequal incomes 
make unequal contributions to the financing of health care, by assessing the deviation of 
health payment concentration curve from the Lorenz curve describing the income 
distribution. The degree of to which payments departed from proportionality to incomes 3 
was summarized using the progressivity index proposed by (Kakwani 1977). Horizontal 
inequity, i.e. the degree to which equals contribute unequally, was measured as the 
additional redistributive effect, over and above that due to departures from 
proportionality, as a result of the differential payments of those on equal incomes using 
an approach introduced by (Aronson et al. 1994).  
To a large extent, the distribution of the economic burden of health care is determined 
by the structure of financing: the split between direct payment and pre-payment and the 
relative contributions of taxation, social insurance and private insurance to the latter. 
The balance between direct payment and pre-payment determines the extent to which 
actual or potential users pay for health care. Direct payments are charged in relation to 
actual costs, while private insurance premiums are related to (pooled) expected costs. 
Taxation and social insurance break the link between use of health care, realised or 
expected, and financial liability. Instead, liability can be made a function of ability to 
pay. Taxation addresses the bill for health care to the taxpayer and, indirectly, it is 
mostly workers and consumers that pick up this bill. Social insurance places the main 
burden on workers. Private insurance accumulates funds from those that choose to 
insure against the cost of future illness. Analyses of the distribution of health payments 
in OECD countries was instructive in showing how alternative mixes of health care 
financing sources (taxes, social insurance, private insurance and direct payments) may 
lead to very different consequences for progressivity and redistribution. We just give 
two examples here. It was, for instance, very revealing to find that mainly tax-financed 
systems (like the Scandinavian ones) are not necessarily more progressive than mainly 
social-insurance financed health systems (like France or Italy). Similarly, it was 
interesting to learn that the income redistributive effect (from rich to poor) of tax 
payments going into health care was larger in the US (a largely privately funded system) 
than in the UK (a largely publicly funded system), not because US direct taxes are more 
progressive, but simply because the size of the fraction of income going to health 
funding and raised through taxes is higher in the US than in the UK. To a large extent, 
the distribution of the economic burden of health care is determined by the structure of 
financing: the split between direct payment and pre-payment and the relative 
contributions of taxation, social insurance and private insurance to the latter. The 
balance between direct payment and pre-payment determines the extent to which actual 
or potential users pay for health care. Direct payments are charged in relation to actual 
costs, while private insurance premiums are related to (pooled) expected costs. Taxation 
and social insurance break the link between use of health care, realised or expected, and 
financial liability. Instead, liability can be made a function of ability to pay. Taxation 
addresses the bill for health care to the taxpayer and, indirectly, it is mostly workers and 
consumers that pick up this bill. Social insurance places the main burden on workers. 
Private insurance accumulates funds from those that choose to insure against the cost of 
future illness. 
2.1  Distribution of health financing in Asia 
O’Donnell et al. (2008) have analysed the structure and the distribution of health care 
financing in 13 territories that account for 55 per cent of the Asian population. Private 
insurance plays a relatively minor role in most of the health systems considered. The 
main distinguishing factor in these health financing systems is the balance between 
public pre-payment and private out-of-pocket (OOP) payment. The latter accounts for at 
least 30 per cent of total expenditure on health (TEH) in all territories, except Japan.  4 
Figure 1: Out-of-pocket (OOP) and general government taxes (TAX) as share of total 
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Source: O’Donnell et al. (2008). 
 
As is clear from the health financing triangle in Figure 1, these Asian territories 
conform to the stylised fact that reliance on OOP payments declines with the level of 
development. Poorer territories such as Nepal, Bangladesh, Kyrgyz, Punjab and Sri 
Lanka are all very close to the 45˚ line, indicating that health care is financed almost 
exclusively from OOP and general government revenues (GGR). Nepal and Bangladesh 
rely more heavily on OOP, while the burden is close to being evenly split in Kyrgyz, 
Punjab and Sri Lanka. The distance from any point to the 45˚ line gives the share 
contributed by insurance, social and/or private. The high/middle-income territories—
Japan, Taiwan and South Korea—lying furthest below the 45˚ line have significant 
social insurance systems. Hong Kong, the only other high-income territory, also relies 
predominantly on publicly financed pre-payment, but does this through taxation rather 
than social insurance. Japan and Taiwan collect more than half of health system funding 
from social insurance, while high co-payments in Korea mean that it still collects half of 
all financing from direct payments. The remainder of financing in China comes from 
social insurance (16.5 per cent) and community financing arrangements (8.2 per cent). 
Using survey data on household payments, incidence assumptions and health accounts 
data on aggregate expenditures by source, O’Donnell et al. (2008) have estimated the 
distributions of each financing source and of total health financing by ability to pay. A 
selection of results is presented in Figure 2, showing concentration and Kakwani indices 
for total payments, and obtained as a weighted sum of the various sources (i.e. taxes, 
social and private insurance premiums and direct payments), weighted by their (macro) 
revenue shares. The positive concentration indices indicate that in all these territories, 
high-income households contribute more than low-income households to the financing 
of health care. But only in low- and lower middle-income countries and in Hong Kong 5 
are the Kakwani indices positive, indicating that the better off contribute more as a 
proportion of their ability to pay. The disproportionality is in the opposite direction in 
three high/middle income territories operating universal social insurance. Disaggregated 
results presented in O’Donnell et al. (2008) show that direct taxation is the most 
progressive source of finance and is most progressive in poorer economies with a 
narrow tax base. The distribution of out-of-pocket (OOP) payments also depends on the 
level of development. In high-income economies with widespread insurance coverage, 
OOP payments absorb a larger fraction of the resources of low-income households. In 
poor economies, it is apparently the better off that spend relatively more OOP. At first 
sight, this appears to contradict much of the evidence on regressiveness of direct 
payments in high-income economies (Wagstaff et al. 1999), but it may merely illustrate 
that the poor simply cannot afford to pay for health care in low-income economies. 
Among the high-income territories, Hong Kong is the one example of progressive 
financing arising from reliance on taxation, as opposed to social insurance, and an 
ability to shield those on low-incomes from OOP payments. Thailand has a similar 
financing structure and achieves a similar distributional outcome.  
Figure 2: Concentration and Kakwani indices for total health financing 
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Source: O’Donnell et al. (2008). 
 
So the short answer to the question ‘who pays for health care in Asia?’ is that the better-
off pay more. Does this mean that health care financing in these countries is very 
redistributive? No, the picture is somewhat misleading because with the exception of 
Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan and Japan, and more recently Thailand, none of these 
countries have ensured close to universal coverage of a fairly comprehensive package of 
health services. Only these higher income countries have divorced the link between 
payment for care (on the basis of the ability to pay principle) and receipt of health care 
(largely on the basis of the need principle, see below) and a redistribution interpretation 
can be placed on the progressivity of health payments as in other OECD countries. For 
all others, the lack of coverage for a substantial share, if not the majority, of the 
population and the reliance on out-of-pocket direct payments for funding at least 50 per 6 
cent―and often much more―of their health care, means that it is the benefit principle 
that predominantly governs the distribution of payments for health care. The distribution 
of OOP payments largely reflects the distribution of benefits (in the absence of fee 
waivers) and must be interpreted as such. While in high-income economies the 
distribution of health financing is of interest largely because of its implications for the 
distribution of income, in low-income economies it is the consequences of health care 
financing for the distribution of health care, and subsequently health, that is of primarily 
of interest. Nonetheless, health payments can have a substantial effect on the economic 
welfare of households in low coverage situations. But it is the income risk arising from 
these payments, rather than income redistribution, which is of greatest interest. With 
restricted health insurance cover, large, unforeseen expenditures on health care can have 
catastrophic consequences for living standards and, in the extreme, may push 
households into, or further into, poverty (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003; Xu et al. 
2003). In the next two sections we discuss how the threat that out-of-pocket health 
payments pose to living standards can be analysed and illustrate the methods with 
findings for Asian countries.  
2.2  Catastrophic health payments in Asia 
Health care can be expensive. In the absence of insurance cover, households with severe 
and immediate medical needs can be forced to spend a large fraction of the household 
budget on health care. Such spending must be accommodated by cutting back on 
consumption of other goods and services, by accumulating debt, by running down 
savings or by selling assets. Whichever the financing strategy adopted, the household 
suffers a cost that may be labelled ‘catastrophic’. The concept of catastrophic payments 
has been put into operation by defining them as occurring once OOP payments cross 
some threshold share of household total expenditure (Berki 1986; Wyszewianski 1986; 
Pradhan and Prescott 2002; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003; Xu et al. 2003). While it 
is acknowledged that the choice of threshold is arbitrary, 10 per cent of total 
expenditure has been a common choice (Pradhan and Prescott 2002; Ranson 2002; 
Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003); with the rationale that this represents an 
approximate threshold at which the household is forced to sacrifice other basic needs, 
sell productive assets, incur debt, or be impoverished (Russell 2004).  
Prevalence of catastrophic payments can be measured by a headcount—the percentage 
of households spending more on health care than some threshold fraction of resources. 
The threshold may be defined as a fraction of total or, given that food spending is close 
to subsistence level and is less discretionary in very poor households, of non-food 
expenditure (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003). Van Doorslaer et al. (2007) have 
estimated the prevalence of catastrophic health payments in fourteen countries and 
territories in Asia, together accounting for 81 per cent of the Asian population. The 
findings can be summarized as follows. First, heavy reliance on OOP financing has 
important consequences for household living standards. Figure 3 presents prevalence 
estimates at four different threshold values. The headcount necessarily falls as the 
threshold is raised but changing the threshold does not substantially affect the ranking 
of countries with the highest/lowest incidence of catastrophic payments. OOP payments 
for health care absorb more than 10 per cent of household resources in at least one-tenth 7 
of all households in Bangladesh, China, India, Korea and Vietnam.
1 Alternative 
measures of catastrophic payments that, analogous to the poverty gap, reflect their 
intensity as well as prevalence can be calculated. Since the majority of the population 
does not incur catastrophic payments, the prevalence tends to dominate such statistics 
and the general pattern across countries is similar to that for the headcount (van 
Doorslaer et al. 2007).  
Figure 3: Percentage of households incurring catastrophic payments: various 
thresholds for OOP as % of total expenditure 
Source: Van Doorslaer et al. (2007). 
 
Second, the lower income countries, with usually higher OOP finance shares, have a 
higher prevalence of catastrophic payments (see Figure 3), although there is still 
substantial variation at similar OOP financing contributions. China, for instance, relies 
on OOP financing only slightly more than Indonesia, but the prevalence of catastrophic 
payments is much higher in China than Indonesia. This does not appear to be simply a 
reflection of the fact that, on average, Chinese are better-off than Indonesians since the 
difference exists even when catastrophic payments are defined with respect to non-food 
expenditure. Clearly, the propensity to spend on medicine is higher in China than 
Indonesia and there is less protection against very high medical bills that exhaust a 
substantial share of household resources. There is some evidence that government 
intervention in Indonesia is effective in reducing exposure to catastrophic health 
payment risks (Pradhan and Prescott 2002).  
Third, there are also important differences across countries in the distribution of 
catastrophic payments. Figure 4 presents concentration indices for the incidence of 
catastrophic spending. It shows that in high-income territories, catastrophic payments 
tend to be evenly distributed, or even slightly concentrated on the less well-off. In most 
low-income countries, however, it is households with higher total expenditure that are 
                                                 
1 When the catastrophic threshold is defined as a proportion of non-food expenditures, poor economies 
like Nepal and Kyrgyztan move to a higher—and richer ones like Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong to a 
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more likely to spend a large fraction of those resources on health care. This reflects the 
inability of the poorest of the poor to divert resources from basic needs. But in some 
countries, it also seems to reflect the protection of the poor from user charges. In China, 
Kyrgyz and Vietnam, where there are no exemptions of the poor from charges, the poor 
are as likely, or even more likely, to incur catastrophic payments.  
Figure 4: Concentration indices for catastrophic headcount (OOP>10% total exp.) 
Source: Van Doorslaer et al. (2007). 
 
In sum, there is cross-country variation in the prevalence and distribution of 
catastrophic payments that seems to be attributable to differences in national income, 
financing structure and user charging policy. Economic development is certainly an 
important determinant of the degree to which household welfare is put at risk by health 
payments, but there is no iron law that condemns the households of low-income 
countries to suffer financial hardship because of these payments. Some countries, in 
particular Malaysia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand have managed to contain 
the OOP health financing share below the average level at their national incomes. In 
contrast, Bangladesh, China, India, and Vietnam, stand out in relying heavily on OOP 
financing and having a high incidence of catastrophic payments. While the second 
group of countries is, in general, poorer, there is, for instance, little difference between 
the average incomes of China and Sri Lanka.  
Descriptive studies of catastrophic payments such as described above have obvious 
limitations. First, they do not examine the impact of OOP payments on the quantity and 
quality of care consumed and need to be complemented by studies of health care 
utilization. Second, they do not capture all potentially catastrophic effects of illness or 
disability, such as lost earnings. Third, they do not investigate whether health shocks are 
absorbed by using borrowing or dis-saving to smooth consumption (Gertler and Gruber 
2002). If households can cope in the short run by using borrowing, savings or assets to 
finance health care and so protect other consumption, then the impact in the current 
period may be overstated. Flores et al. (2008) take into account self-reported coping 
behaviour with high outlays for inpatient care in India and find that coping-adjusted 






















2.3  Impoverishment 
Paying for health care may push households into, or further into, poverty. Such 
impoverishment is not captured by the standard measures of poverty that compare total 
household resources, including those exhausted by health care, with a poverty line that 
reflects needs for food and possibly those for other basic necessities but cannot take full 
account of health care needs. The variability and unpredictability of health care costs 
means that they cannot be reflected in a given poverty line. If expenditures on health 
care were completely non-discretionary, constituting resources that are not available to 
meet other basic needs, then it would be appropriate to assess poverty on the basis of 
household resources net of payments for health care.
2 Of course, not all expenditures on 
health care are made without discretion. There is ample evidence that such expenditures 
are responsive to incomes and prices. Nonetheless, it is likely that households make 
great sacrifices in order to meet needs for vital health care. It seems inaccurate to 
categorise a household as non-poor simply because high medical expenses raise its total 
spending above the poverty line, while spending on food, clothing and shelter is below 
subsistence levels.  
The difference between poverty estimates derived from household expenditures gross 
and net of OOP payments for health care provides a rough approximation to the poverty 
impact of such payments (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003; Gustaffson and Li 2004). 
Van Doorslaer et al. (2006b) have estimated the change in the poverty headcount ratios 
for 11 low-to-middle-income countries in Asia by comparing household consumption/ 
expenditure both gross and net of OOP health payments relative to two poverty lines. 
Their baseline poverty estimates, shown in Table 1, are quite consistent with those of 
the World Bank (Chen and Ravallion 2004). At the $1.08 poverty line, subtracting OOP 
payments from total resources results in a 3.8 percentage point increase in the headcount 
in Bangladesh, equivalent to almost 5 million people, a 3.7 percentage point increase in 
India (over 37 million) and a 2.6 percentage point increase in China (32.4 million). The 
total estimated increase in the poverty headcount is 78.25 million people, or 2.7 per cent 
of the population of these eleven low/middle-income Asian countries. This does not, of 
course, provide an estimate of how poverty would change if some form of pre-payment 
replaced OOP financing of health care. Identification of such an effect would require 
tracing the impact of such a reform on households’ utilization of health care, work 
effort, consumption and savings. Nonetheless, the figure is informative of the magnitude 
of the impoverishing effect of payments for health care that is not currently reflected in 
poverty estimates. It tells us how many individuals are not counted as poor despite the 
fact that the value of their consumption of all goods and services other than health care 
is less than the extreme poverty line of $1.08 per day.  
In absolute percentage point terms, the largest increases in poverty at the lower poverty 
line are in Bangladesh, India, China and Nepal. Of course, the number of individuals 
pushed into poverty by OOP payments is greatest in India and China. The relative 
increase in poverty is greatest, by far, in Vietnam, where the poverty rate rises by a 
third. It rises by 18.9 per cent in China, 16.8 per cent in Bangladesh and 11.9 per cent in 
India. As we saw in previous sections, these are the countries with the highest OOP 
                                                 
2 A National Academy of Sciences Panel made this recommendation as the appropriate approach to 
measuring poverty in the USA (Cirto and Michael 1995). Alternative estimates of USA poverty based on 
the approach are available (Short et al. 1999; Short and Garner 2002). 10 
budget shares and prevalence of catastrophic payments. It would appear to be both the 
high levels of OOP payments and their even distribution throughout the income 
distribution that is responsible for the very high poverty impacts in Vietnam and China. 
But there are still large poverty impacts in Bangladesh and India, where OOP payments 
are more heavily concentrated on the better-off.  
Regression analysis confirms that the percentage point change in the poverty headcount 
is positively correlated with the OOP financing share and, as would be expected, with 
the initial headcount (van Doorslaer et al. 2006b). Deviations from the positive 
correlation between the initial poverty headcount and the absolute poverty impact are 
more interesting than the relationship itself. For example, the initial headcount is higher 
in the Philippines than it is in China but the poverty impact is more than four times 
greater in China. And initial headcounts are similar in Sri Lanka and Vietnam but the 
poverty impact in Vietnam is four times that in Sri Lanka. These differences point to the 
consequences of high reliance on OOP financing in China and Vietnam. The proportion 
of the population at risk of falling below the $1 threshold, defined as those initially 
between the $1 and $2 thresholds, is not significantly correlated with the poverty 
adjustment, suggesting that there is substantial cross-country variation in the extent to 
which vulnerable individuals are protected from the impoverishing effects of health 
payments. This can be seen directly in Figure 5. Roughly one-half of the population live 
on between $1 and $2 per day in Bangladesh, India and Indonesia. However, while 3.7 
per cent of the population slip below the $1 threshold in both Bangladesh and India after 
subtracting payments for health care, only 0.7 per cent of Indonesians are impoverished. 
In the five countries in which 30-40 per cent of the population lie between the two 
poverty thresholds, there are substantial differences in the poverty impacts. Over 2 per 
cent are impoverished in China and Nepal, 1.2 per cent in Vietnam and much less than 1 
per cent in the Philippines and Sri Lanka. Again, these differences reflect different 
degrees of reliance on OOP financing. But this does not explain all the differences. 
Vietnam is more heavily reliant on OOP payments than China but is apparently more 
successful in limiting their impoverishing effect. 
The impoverishing effect of health care payments is further illustrated graphically for 
the example of China in Figure 6 using a Pen Parade graph as suggested by (Wagstaff 
and van Doorslaer 2003). The chart plots household pre-payment consumption per 
capita against the cumulative percentage of individuals ranked by pre-payment 
consumption. At the intersection of this curve with the poverty line, the x-coordinate is 
the poverty headcount: 13.7 per cent in China at the $1.08 poverty line. The area below 
the poverty line but above the pre-payment curve gives the poverty gap. From the pre-
payment curve, the vertical lines show what happens to consumption after payments for 
health care are subtracted, and which individuals are pulled below the poverty line by 
such payments. It can be seen that mainly individuals in the bottom third of the gross 
expenditure distribution are pulled below the $1-per-day threshold by medical expenses, 
while those in the middle third of the pre-payment distribution are most likely to be left 
below the $2-per-day threshold after netting out health payments. There are also many 
individuals high up in the pre-payment distribution that incur large (or catastrophic) 
medical expenses, without these necessarily driving the household into absolute 
poverty. 
 11 
Table 1: Poverty headcounts: effect of taking account of OOP payments for health care  
















































Bangladesh 22.5%  26.3%  3.8%  4940585 16.8 73.0%  76.5%  3.6% 4653875 4.9 
China 13.7%  16.2%  2.6%  32431209  18.8 44.6%  46.4%  1.8%  23198460  4.1 
India 31.1%  34.8%  3.7%  37358760  11.9 80.3%  82.4%  2.1%  20638361  2.6 
Indonesia 7.9%  8.6%  0.7%  1440395  8.7 58.2%  59.9% 1.7%  3493767  2.9 
Kyrgyz Rep.  2.2%  2.7%  0.1%  5989  4.7 32.2%  34.1% 1.9% 94793  6.0 
Malaysia 1.0%  1.1%  0.1%  10562  4.4 11.8%  12.1% 0.3% 58626  2.1 
Nepal 39.3%  41.6%  2.2%  515933  5.7 80.4%  81.7% 1.3% 290280 1.6 
Philippines 15.8%  16.4%  0.6%  445680  3.7 50.2%  51.2% 1.1% 790333 2.1 
Sri Lanka  3.8%  4.1%  0.3%  60116  8.3 39.1%  40.8% 1.7% 325783 4.3 
Thailand 2.1%  2.3%  0.2%  100201  7.9 24.2%  24.9% 0.7% 417626 2.8 
Vietnam 3.6%  4.7%  1.1%  848870  30.1 36.9%  41.4%  4.5% 3492321  12.1 
TOTAL 19.3%  22.0%  2.7%  78158299  14.0 58.8%  60.8%  2.0%  57454225  3.4 
 
Notes: Column (3)=(2)-(1). Column (4)=(3)*population. Column (5)=(3)/(1). Bold figures in columns (3) and (8) denote statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% 
significance level.  
Source: Van Doorslaer et al. (2006b). 
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Source: Van Doorslaer et al. (2006b). 
 
Figure 6: Pen’s Parade and out-of-pocket health payments, China 2000 
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Under conditions, the difference between poverty estimates derived from household 
resources gross and net of OOP payments for health care may be interpreted as a rough 
approximation to the impoverishing effect of such payments. Only if OOP payments for 
health care were completely non-discretionary and total household resources fixed, the 
difference between the two estimates would correspond to poverty due to health 
payments. Neither of the two conditions holds perfectly. A household that chooses to 
spend excessively on health care is not pushed into poverty by OOP payments. A 
household may borrow to cover health care expenses. Then, household expenditure 
gross of OOP payments does not correspond to the resources that would be available in 
the absence of those payments. For such reasons, our comparison of poverty estimates 
cannot be interpreted as the change in poverty that would arise from some policy reform 
that eliminated OOP payments for health care. Nonetheless, the comparison is 
indicative of the scale of the impoverishing effect of health payments and it does show 
the extent to which poverty is currently underestimated (or hidden) by ignoring the 
amount of household resources that are exhausted by payments for health care. 
Impoverishment will be observed only if a household spends on health care. But many 
households may be so poor that they are unable to spare any resources to spend on 
health care and must go without. Considering the links from forgone health care to 
health and subsequently earnings, the long-term poverty impact of charges may be 
substantially greater than the short-term effect on current consumption. It is important 
therefore to consider the impact of payments on the distribution of health care and not 
only on the distribution of economic resources. 
3  Inequality and inequity in health care utilization 
The distribution of health care in relation to income is of interest for many reasons. 
Foremost are consequences for health inequality. If the poor are relatively deprived of 
effective health care interventions, income-related inequalities in health will be 
exacerbated. Not only is this of immediate concern, it will strengthen the health-poverty 
trap that can retard economic growth (Sala-i-Martin 2005). The distribution of health 
care may also be examined to assess whether there is equity in the allocation of health 
care resources. This is the motivation that has been predominant in OECD countries 
focused research on the distribution of health care (van Doorslaer et al. 1992; van 
Doorslaer 2000; van Doorslaer et al. 2006a). The aim has been to establish whether the 
distribution of health care obeys the principle of horizontal equity, defined as equal 
treatment for equal need (ETEN). After standardizing for differences in need, any 
remaining income-related inequality in the utilization of health care is interpreted as 
horizontal inequity (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2000). The evidence suggests that 
many OECD countries are close to achieving their horizontal equity objectives, 
although the results often differ markedly by type of utilization. This approach has also 
proved feasible in three of the higher-income countries in the Asian study with near 
universal coverage (Lu et al. 2007). 
Application in low-coverage settings runs into two problems. The first is conceptual. 
The horizontal equity approach uses the observed average relationship between use and 
need characteristics (while appropriately controlling for other factors) as the implicit 14 
norm to identify needed or need-expected use. In other words it assumes that, ‘on 
average, the system gets it right’ (van Doorslaer et al. 2000b). This assumption may be 
appropriate in systems which have a long experience with near universal and 
comprehensive coverage, but is clearly more likely to be violated in systems with very 
partial coverage of population and services. The second problem concerns data 
requirements, which for this analysis include measures of income, health care use and 
need for the same individuals. In the OECD focused research, need has been proxied by 
demographics and self-reported measures of health. Its application to low-income 
countries is currently constrained by the availability and reliability of self-reported 
health measures, which often fail to show the income gradients that are observable in 
more objective, but less general, measures of health, such as infant mortality (Murray 
1996; Wagstaff 2002). In fact, self-reported measures often fail to show any income 
gradient in health, or even a pro-poor gradient (Baker and Van der Gaag 1993), 
suggesting substantial income-related differences in the conception and reporting of 
health problems. This reporting bias issue will be examined in the next section. First, let 
us consider how equity in the utilization of health care can be assessed in low-income 
countries without reliable self-reported measures of health and without an estimate of 
the relationship between use and need that can be used as the norm in standardizing for 
need differences. 
There is no problem if there is little or no variation in need. Then, inequality in 
utilization represents inequity. Variation in need will often be limited provided that the 
population group and treatment of interest are defined to be sufficiently homogeneous. 
For example, all children within a certain age band are in need of immunization against 
measles, tuberculosis, etc. While it could legitimately be argued that the benefit from 
immunization varies with prevalence of the disease in the child’s locality, such variation 
in need is limited in comparison with that for adults’ visits to a doctor. Demographic 
and Health Survey data show clear pro-rich disparities in child immunization rates, use 
of antenatal care and medically attended births (Gwatkin et al. 2003), for example, that 
can be interpreted as inequity and not merely inequality. 
Conclusions about equity can sometimes be inferred from the distribution of utilization 
if there is prior knowledge of the distribution of need. For example, it is well established 
that rates of mortality and malnutrition are higher among poorer children in many low-
income countries (Gwatkin et al. 2003). Poor children, and quite probably poor adults, 
are in greater need of medical interventions. If the distribution of health care is not 
skewed toward the poor, then this is sufficient to reject the proposition of equity. Pro-
rich inequality in utilization then provides a lower bound to the degree of pro-rich 
inequity. In high-income countries this approach is not helpful since the poor tend to use 
health care more than the rich. There the question is whether the greater utilization by 
the poor matches their greater need such that equity is achieved. In low-income 
countries, however, inequality in utilization often does not favour the poor and it is 
possible to make a statement about inequity without simultaneously measuring need. It 
is evidently not possible, however, to make precise estimates of the degree of inequity, 
which limits the ability to make cross-country or other comparisons. 
Besides concern for health sector equity, redistribution of economic welfare provides a 
further motivation for public provision of health care in low-income countries. With 
severe informational and administrative constraints on redistribution through tax and 
cash transfers, in-kind transfers, such as health care, can be used to effect redistribution 
of final incomes provided the poor make greater use of such transfers (Besley and Coate 15 
1991). Establishing whether such redistribution takes place requires identification of the 
incidence of public spending on health care in relation to the distribution of income. If 
public health care is more concentrated on the poor than is income, then it raises the 
economic welfare of the poor relative to that of the better-off and inequality in final 
incomes is reduced. Note that this does not require that the poor receive absolutely more 
health care than the rich. Public spending on health care could be pro-rich but still 
inequality-reducing. 
The EQUITAP study has examined whether public spending on health care was (a) pro-
poor, and (b) inequality-reducing in eight Asian countries and three Chinese 
provinces/regions (O’Donnell et al. 2007a). These questions were addressed by testing 
dominance of the concentration curve of the public health subsidy against the 45
o line, 
representing an equal distribution, and the Lorenz curve of household consumption 
respectively. Formal statistical tests of dominance were used for inference (Bishop et al. 
1992). By way of example, subsidy concentration curves and Lorenz curves for 
Malaysia and India are presented in Figure 7. The concentration curve in Malaysia lies 
(significantly) above the diagonal—it is pro-poor. In India, by contrast, the curve lies 
below the diagonal—the poor get less than a proportionate share of public health care. 
While the subsidy concentration curve in India appears to be slightly inside the Lorenz 
curve, the difference is not statistically significant. The hypothesis that public spending 
on health care in India has no impact on inequality in living standards cannot be 
rejected. 
 
Figure 7: Concentration curve of public health subsidy and Lorenz curve of household 
consumption per equivalent adult 
Source: Derived from data and analysis reported in O'Donnell et al. (2007a). 
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Dominance results for all countries included in the study are summarized in Table 2. 
Public spending on health care is pro-poor only in the three highest income countries. 
Sri Lanka is the only low-income country that distributes public health care equally. It is 
pro-rich in all the other low-income countries, but in most cases is also inequality-
reducing. The two exceptions are India and Nepal, where the share of public spending 
received by the poor does not even surpass their share of total consumption. 
The concentration indices presented in Figure 8 measure the degree of income-related 
inequality in the distribution of public health spending. The pro-poor inequality in Hong 
Kong, indicated by a negative concentration index, is much greater than that in 
Malaysia and Thailand. As anticipated from the result of the dominance test, the index 
is zero in Sri Lanka, indicating equality. It is only very slightly positive in Vietnam 
suggesting that the pro-rich inequality detected by the dominance test is marginal. The 
pro-rich bias is more substantial in the other low-income countries and is greatest in the 
poorest country—Nepal. The Kakwani index—equal to the concentration index less 
the Gini coefficient—is negative in all countries but for Nepal, indicating inequality-
reduction, as could be anticipated from the dominance tests. The index is greatest in 
absolute value in Hong Kong, indicating that is where the distribution of public health 
spending diverges most from proportionality to income. Since the level of public health 
spending relative to national income is also greatest in Hong Kong, it can be inferred 
that the reduction in inequality is greatest there. In fact, with the exception of the 
Chinese provinces, aggregate government spending on health as a proportion of GDP is 
greatest in the countries where this spending is distributed least proportionately to 
income and so inequality-reduction will be greatest in these countries.  
 
 
Table 2: Distribution of public health subsidy in Asia 
  Inequality-reducing  Inequality neutral 




Equal  Sri Lanka   







Source: Derived from results reported in Table 1 of O'Donnell et al. (2007a). 
Notes: Pro-poor, concentration curve statistically dominates (lies above) the 45
o line of equality. Pro-rich, 
concentration curve is statistically dominated by the 45
o line. Equality, concentration curve is statistically 
indistinguishable from the 45
o line. Inequality-reducing, concentration curve statistically dominates the 
Lorenz curve. Inequality neutral, concentration curve is statistically indistinguishable from (India) or 
crosses (Nepal) the Lorenz curve. 
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Source: O'Donnell et al. (2007a: Table S.3). 
 
Cross-country differences in the distribution of public health care are assessed by tests 
of dominance between concentration curves. Results are reported in Table 3. The 
distribution in Hong Kong dominates, i.e. is more pro-poor, than that in all other 
countries. The distributions in Malaysia, Thailand and Sri Lanka are indistinguishable. 
Malaysia and Thailand dominate all other distributions and Sri Lanka dominates all 
others but for Vietnam and Bangladesh. Vietnam dominates the remainder of countries. 
So, countries/provinces can be broadly grouped as follows in relation to the distribution 
of public health care: (a) Hong Kong (very pro-poor); (b) Malaysia, Thailand and Sri 
Lanka (mildly pro-poor to neutral); (c) Vietnam (mildly pro-rich); (d) Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, India, Gansu, Heilongjiang and Nepal (very pro-rich). 
The interpretation of these results requires consideration of two questions. First, in the 
many low-income countries in which the poor do not get their share of public health 
care, does this necessarily represent a failure of public policy? Second, why is it that 
public health care is more pro-poor in Malaysia, Thailand, Sri Lanka and, to a lesser 
extent, Vietnam than in other developing countries of Asia? 
The answer to the first of these questions largely depends on the objectives of the public 
health spending. If the aim is to ensure that the poor get more public health services 
than the better-off, then the objective is clearly not being achieved in most cases. 
Alternatively, subsidising health care may be part of a wider policy to reduce relative 
differences in living standards between rich and poor. With the exceptions of India and 
Nepal, the subsidy achieves this objective. It is inequality reducing. But those concerned 
about inequalities within the health sector may not be content with reduction in general 
economic inequality. From this perspective, is the fact that the poor get less of the 
subsidy necessarily a failure? Despite its name, benefit incidence analysis informs of the 
incidence of public health expenditures, rather than the benefits from these 
expenditures. Even though the poor get a lower than proportionate share of the subsidy, 
the impact on their health can be greater if the marginal product is declining with the 
pro-rich 




initial level of health (given a positive relationship between income and health) (Filmer 
et al. 2002). Further, the analysis describes the distribution of the subsidy and does not 
identify the impact of the subsidy on the distribution of health care, nor health. The poor 
would be less able to afford health care in the absence of public provision, while the 
crowding-out effect will be greater for the better-off. Consequently, the poor may get 
less of the subsidy but experience a larger net effect on total health care utilization 
(Filmer et al. 2002). While the distribution of the subsidy is not pro-poor, the subsidy 
can still shift the distribution of health care in a pro-poor direction. These hypotheses 
are consistent with evidence showing that public spending has no significant effect on 
health of the non-poor but a positive marginal impact on the health of the poor (Bidani 
and Ravallion 1997; Gupta et al. 2003; Wagstaff 2003). 
Table 3: Cross-country dominance of public health subsidy concentration curves 
 
 
Source: O'Donnell et al. (2007a: Table 4). 
 
The evidence shows that, on average, the better-off typically receive most of the 
subsidy. But this is informative of the distributional implications of a policy change 
only if marginal changes in the subsidy were delivered in strict proportion to current 
utilization (Younger 2003). Of course, many policy reforms will deliver marginal gains 
that differ from average gains (Lanjouw and Ravallion 1999). For example, the political 
power of higher-income classes may allow them to capture most of the initial public 
spending on health but as their lower health needs are satisfied, additional programmes 
may disproportionately benefit the poor. Then additional public spending will shift the 
distribution in a pro-poor direction. There is some evidence, admittedly not particularly 
strong, that this holds for primary care in Indonesia (Lanjouw et al. 2002). So, caution 
should be exercised in interpreting evidence of pro-rich bias in the distribution of the 
public health subsidy. It does not necessarily mean that public policy is not shifting 
health care resources toward the poor. 
Malaysia Thailand Sri Lanka Vietnam Bangladesh Indonesia India Gansu  Heilongjiang  Nepal




























Bangladesh ns ns ns ns ns
Indonesia ns D ns D
India Dn s D
Gansu (China) ns ns
Heilongjiang (China) ns
Notes:  D indicates rejection of the null that curves are indistinguishable in favour of dominance (more pro-poor)  
    of the row country over than column country using the multiple comparison test and 5% significance. 
ns indicates failure to reject the null that the curves are indistinguishable. There are no cases of curves
     crossing.
* indicates that the intersection-union test rejects the null of nondominance against the alternative 
    of strict dominance at 5%. If no * appears, this test does not reject its null.19 
Figure 9: Public health spending: magnitude and incidence 
 
Source: Derived from results presented in O'Donnell et al.( 2007a). 
 
 
Characteristics of the health care systems of Malaysia, Thailand and Sri Lanka that can 
be expected to contribute to a more pro-poor distribution of resources can be identified. 
In particular, all three emphasise universality and seek to minimize user charges or have 
effective systems of exempting the poor from such charges. The scale of public funding 
to health care in these countries is another possible contributory factor. Figure 9 shows a 
clear negative relationship between the scale of public health spending and its 
concentration index—public spending is more pro-poor where it is higher.
3 Of course, 
this is only an association and many common factors, including political institutions and 
preferences, may drive both the level and the distribution of public health spending. 
Nonetheless, there are mechanisms through which the scale of funding could affect its 
incidence. More resources allow a wider geographic distribution of resources bringing 
health services closer to the rural poor. Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Vietnam all have public 
health facilities in close proximity to the rural population. For the trickle-down 
mechanism described in the previous paragraph to take effect, spending levels have to 
reach sufficiently high levels such that the health needs of the better-off begin to be 
satisfied. 
While relatively high levels of public spending can ensure adequate technical quality in 
the public sector, universality of access leads to long waiting times and minimal 
amenities, creating incentives for the better-off to opt-out of the public sector. These 
incentives become stronger as the economy grows, as it has done most impressively in 
Malaysia and Thailand, and there is an expansion of middle and higher income groups 
                                                 
3 The two Chinese provinces are exemptions to this relationship. This is partly due to the fact that the 
public spending figures include social health insurance, which is a much larger share of the total in China 




































































with not only the desire but also the means to purchase higher quality care in the private 
sector (Hammer et al. 1995). Figure 10 shows clear discrepancies between the 
distributions of public and private inpatient care in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Sri Lanka 
and Thailand. But in Bangladesh, India and Indonesia, the distribution of private sector 
care is only slightly more pro-rich than is care in the public sector. In these countries 
there does not yet exist a large middle-class with the effective demand for the greater 
convenience of private sector care. In addition, quality differentials between the sectors 
can be limited. In Bangladesh and India, the poor make extensive use of unqualified 
private sector providers that may be cheaper and more accessible than public sector 
alternatives. In Hong Kong, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Thailand, private sector care is 
pro-rich while the public sector is pro-poor or neutral. The combination of (near) 
universal public provision, a private sector offering an attractive alternative, and 
incomes that make demand for this alternative effective leads to redistribution through 
public provision in the way that theory predicts (Besley and Coate 1991). 
Figure 10: Distribution of public and private hospital inpatient care 
Source: Somanathan et al. (2005). 
In summary, the analysis shows that the pervasive outcome of a pro-rich distribution of 
public health care in most Asian and other low-income countries is not unavoidable but 
that effective targeting is easier to realise at higher national incomes. Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Thailand have demonstrated that the allocation of sufficient 
public resources coupled with a policy of universal access can ensure far greater 
benefits to the poor than may have hitherto been assumed. Higher incomes not only 
make such policies more feasible, it also makes them more effective, with respect to the 
target efficiency of spending, by availing the private sector opt-out. 
Descriptive analysis such as that presented above is useful in identifying a problem. It 
shows that public spending on health care does not predominantly reach the poor in 
most low-income countries. Hypotheses can be offered to explain this and solutions can 
be proposed. But from a descriptive analysis it is not possible to identify the likely 
effectiveness of any policy reforms in shifting the distribution of health care toward the 
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4 Health  inequality 
Two issues of importance to the study of health inequality in low-income countries are 
considered in this section: (i) reporting heterogeneity in measures of health; 
(ii) decomposition of health inequality and of changes in inequality.  
4.1  Reporting heterogeneity in health measures 
The difficulty confronted in obtaining an accurate measure of health for a study of 
health inequality varies with the type of inequality one is seeking to examine. If the 
purpose is to measure the total variation in health across the population, then detailed 
measures of health available from administrative records or health surveys can be used. 
The task is more difficult if the aim is to measure socioeconomic-related inequality in 
health. Data that provide measures of health and of socioeconomic status for the same 
individuals are then required. There is usually a trade-off between the use of health 
surveys that provide more detailed measures of health but less detailed measures of 
economic status, such as income and consumption, and the use general household and 
expenditure surveys that measure income and/or consumption more accurately but have 
more crude instruments for the measurement of health. In recent years, the demographic 
and health surveys have weakened this trade-off. It has proved possible to construct an 
index of household wealth from data on assets and living conditions and to measure 
inequality in child mortality and nutritional status, for example, in relation to this 
indicator of economic status (Gwatkin et al. 2003). It has been demonstrated for some 
countries that the measurement of economic-related inequality in such health indicators 
is robust to the use of household consumption, rather than a wealth index, as the 
measure of economic status (Wagstaff and Watanabe 2003).4  
The DHS do not provide a measure of general health in the adult population. In research 
on socioeconomic-related inequality in OECD countries, extensive use has been made 
of an indicator of self-assessed health that asks individuals to select a description of 
their health in general from four or five categories ranging, for example, from very good 
to very poor. This indicator has proven, perhaps surprisingly, to be highly informative 
of health status. Controlling for physiological measures of health, it is an independent 
predictor of mortality (Idler and Benyamini 1997). But self-reported measures of health 
have proven to be less useful in low-income countries. As noted in the previous section, 
they do not display the steep socioeconomic gradients that are apparent for more 
objective measures such as child mortality (Murray 1996; Wagstaff 2002) and they can 
even show perverse gradients in which the poor are apparently in better health than the 
rich (Baker and Van der Gaag 1993). This suggests that, for a given health condition, 
the poor report their health more favourably than the better-off. A possible explanation 
is that there are peer effects on the reporting of health. When an ailment is highly 
prevalent within a community or social group, it may not even be recognized as a health 
problem but accepted as the norm. Constrained access to health professionals will also 
                                                 
4 There is evidence from Mozambique that economic-related inequality in the utilization of health care is 
sensitive to the use of consumption or a wealth index as the indicator of economic status (Lindelow 
2006). 22 
limit the opportunities for the poor to learn of their health problems. The magnitude of 
the problem varies with the precise nature of the health questions. Gradients are least 
pronounced for a question, popular in Living Standards Measurement Surveys, which 
asks whether illness was experienced in the past four weeks. Questions about chronic 
conditions and self-assessed health are less common but show slightly more pronounced 
gradients (Wagstaff 2001). 
Case vignettes have been proposed as an instrument to correct for systematic 
heterogeneity in the reporting of health (Tandon et al. 2003; King et al. 2004). The idea 
is to identify variation in reporting behaviour from individuals’ ratings of defined cases. 
For example, sample respondents may be ask to rate, on a 5-point scale, the health of 
someone that cannot walk 100 metres without stopping to catch breath. Variation in the 
ratings with respondents’ characteristics, such as gender, age, income, education and 
nationality, allows estimation of the effects of these characteristics on reporting 
behaviour. Assuming that respondents report on the vignettes in the same way that they 
report their own health, the identified reporting effect can be purged from the rating of 
own health. Inequality in this cleansed measure of health should then reflect variation 
only in true health conditions and not in the reporting of these conditions. 
Bago d’Uva et al. 2008) use vignette data collected for Indonesia, Andrah Pradesh 
(India) and 3 Chinese provinces (Gansu, Henan and Shan-dong), as part of the WHO 
Multi-Country Survey Study of Health and Responsiveness (Sadana 2002), to examine 
the effect of removing systematic reporting heterogeneity from measured disparities in 
health by income, education, demographics and urban-rural location. This involves 
simultaneously estimating the effect of characteristics on rating of the vignettes and on 
rating of own-health under the restriction that the estimated threshold values that 
determine whether a vignette is placed in one health category or another also apply to 
the categorization of own-health. In effect, information from the vignette responses 
identifies how a given latent value of health is rated; leaving the information from the 
rating of own-health to identify how the latent health index varies with characteristics.  
The reporting effects for income are summarized in Figure 11. Each bar shows the 
probability that an individual with given characteristics (i.e. male, 15-29 years, no 
primary-level education and living in a rural area) and with income at the threshold of 
the richest quintile will rate any given vignette as corresponding to very good health 
relative to the probability that an individual with the same characteristics but with 
income at the threshold of the poorest income quintile will rate the vignette in this way. 
So, the bars indicate rich-poor relative differences in the probability of reporting very 
good health. This is done for vignettes classified into five health domains. For the 
Indonesian sample, there appears to be little difference in the reporting of health by 
income. But in the Indian and Chinese samples the higher income groups are less likely 
to report any given condition as corresponding to very good health. In Andrah Pradesh, 
this is true for the domains for pain, self-care and functioning in usual activities. In the 
Chinese provinces, it is true for pain and affective behaviour. Homogeneity in reporting 
behaviour by income is rejected in all but one health domain for the Indian and Chinese 
samples and all but two domains for the Indonesian sample. 
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Source: Bago d'Uva et al. (2008: Figure 1). 
Figure 12: Probability of high-income individual to that of low-income individual reporting own-health as very good health before and after 
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The effect of purging reporting heterogeneity from measured disparities in health by 
income level is illustrated in Figure 12. The bars show the probability that an individual 
with given characteristics, as described above, and with income in the highest quintile 
will report her health as being very good relative to the probability that someone in the 
poorest quintile with the same characteristics will report very good health. The lighter 
red bars are derived from probabilities estimated from a model that does not correct for 
reporting heterogeneity. These rich-poor differences may therefore reflect both true 
differences in health and differences in reporting behaviour. The blue bars show the 
relative probabilities of reporting own-health as very good after purging reporting 
heterogeneity. In the Indonesian sample, there is little evidence of health disparities by 
income before or after purging of reporting bias. The absence of inequality has little 
face validity and may in itself be taken as evidence of reporting differences. If true, it 
seems that the vignette instrument is not sufficiently effective in detecting and purging 
this heterogeneity. In Andrah Pradesh, there is evidence of some income-related 
inequality in health without taking account of reporting bias and when this is corrected 
the measured inequality increases by a relatively large degree in the domains of pain, 
self-care and usual activities but the adjustment is much smaller in the other domains. 
Health disparities are greater in China and the correction increases them further, 
particularly in the domains of pain and affective behaviour. 
This study finds that the way in which individuals report their health varies significantly 
with their socioeconomic and demographic characteristics and this biases measures of 
income-related inequality in health downward. But in most cases, the magnitude of the 
effect is rather small. This may reflect the difficulty poorly educated individuals have in 
completing the vignette exercise, which requires a considerable degree of abstract 
thought. While it is certainly an approach that deserves further experimentation, the jury 
remains out on whether it does offer a sufficiently more accurate way of measuring 
health for the purpose of examining socioeconomic inequality in health in low-income 
countries. 
4.2  Decomposition of health inequality 
Measurement of health inequality is a first step toward understanding the socio-
economic determinants of health and of health sector inequities. A natural next step is 
the explanation of the sources of health inequality and the factors contributing to its 
change over time. Decomposition techniques can be used to provide such explanations. 
The method presented in this section decomposes income-related health inequality, as 
measured by the concentration index, into the contribution of various factors. The 
approach can also be used to explain change in the concentration index. 
Wagstaff et al. (2003) demonstrate that the concentration index of health can be written 
as the sum of the contribution of factors, such as demographics, education, region, etc., 
to income-related health inequality, where each contribution is the product of the 
elasticity of health with respect to the factor and the concentration index of the factor. 
That is, the concentration index can be written as: 
(/ ) / kk k k Cx C G C ε βμ μ =+ ∑  (1) 25 
where μ is the mean of the health measure,  k x  is the mean of kth factor,  k β  is its 
coefficient from least squares regression of health on all factors, Ck is the concentration 
index for the kth factor and GCε  is the generalized concentration index for the error 
term of the regression. The term in brackets is the elasticity of health with respect to the 
kth factor, label this  k η . 
Change in the concentration index can be explained by applying a Oaxaca-type 
decomposition (Oaxaca 1973) to (1) to give, for example, 
() ( ) ( ) 11 1 / kt kt kt kt kt kt t t kk CC C C G C ε η ηη μ −− − Δ= − + − + Δ ∑∑  (2) 
where t indicates time period and Δ denotes first differences. Change in income-related 
inequality in health is decomposed into changes in inequality in the determinants of 
health (the first term), on the one hand, and changes in the elasticities of health with 
respect to these determinants (the second term), on the other. This approach can also be 
used to examine differences in inequality across cross-sectional units, such as countries 
(see e.g. van Doorslaer and Koolman 2004). 
Wagstaff et al. (2003) used these decomposition methods to explain the level and 
change in income-related inequality in child height-for-age z-scores (HAZ), a measure 
of long-term nutritional status, in Vietnam in 1993 and 1998. The results are 
summarized in Figure 13. The concentration index was negative in both years, 
indicating the nutritional status was lower among poorer children. The first two bars in 
the figure show the contribution of each factor to the concentration index. The largest 
contribution is the direct effect of household consumption, the measure of economic 
status against which inequality is assessed. There is also a very large contribution to 
consumption-related nutrition inequality from commune fixed effects. This suggests that 
nutrition and consumption both vary across communes and this commune level 
covariance makes an important contribution to the measured inequality in nutrition. 
There is a smaller contribution from access to sanitation and to safe drinking water in 
1998. Age differences in nutrition and consumption shift the inequality in the other 
direction, toward lower nutrition among the better-off but this is outweighed by the 
other contributions. The concentration index increased in absolute value between 1993 
and 1998 from –0.075 to –0.102 indicating an increase in consumption-related 
inequality in child height deficit. The third bar in the figure shows that most of this 
increase in inequality is explained by changes in the distribution and effect of household 
consumption and in the contribution of the commune level covariance between nutrition 
and consumption.  
Measurement of horizontal inequity in the utilization of health care, as described in 
Section 3, involves measuring income-related inequality in utilization after 
standardising for differences in need. The decomposition approach provides a 
convenient way of doing this. One simply needs to deduct the contributions of the need 
standardizing variables from total inequality (van Doorslaer et al. 2004). An advantage 
is that the analyst can avoid imposing her judgments about what factors should be 
counted as need and therefore justifiably giving rise to variation in utilization. The full 
decomposition results can be presented and the user can choose on which factors to 
standardize. 26 
Figure 13: Decomposition of level and change in concentration index for height-for-age 
z-scores of children less than 10 years old in Vietnam 
Source: Wagstaff et al. (2003). 
 
It should be emphasized that decomposition techniques, such as that described, are 
descriptive. They do not identify causal effects on the distribution of health or health 
care. While decomposition analysis is useful for explaining observed relationships, it 
does not allow inference about how a distribution would change in response to some 
policy intervention. The latter requires causal analysis and data containing some 
independent variation in the intervention variable. Another limitation of the above 
decomposition method is that it only applies to linear, additively separable models. In 
many cases, models to explain health and health care will be intrinsically non-linear and 
the simple linear decomposition will break down and will have to be replaced by other 
approaches that can handle intrinsically non-linear relationships (e.g. Wan 2004).  
5 Conclusion 
This review served to illustrate that, in moving attention from high-to low-income 
countries, some of the standard measurement methodology that has been proposed and 
used to measure income-related inequality in health payments, medical care use and 
health status, cannot straightforwardly be applied in low-income, low health insurance 
coverage settings. Some of the reasons for this are conceptual and relate to different 
equity priorities concerning the finance and provision of health care in such countries. 
Others derive from measurement problems.  
With respect to finance, it is obvious that in systems with small revenue shares deriving 
from prepayments, questions of income redistribution or deviations from proportionality 
come secondary to questions of income protection. This is why measures of incidence 



















required to assess the equity performance of health financing systems. Measures of 
progressivity and redistributive effect may even be misleading if used to examine the 
distribution of payments that are mainly driven by the benefit principle, rather than the 
ability to pay principle. In low-income countries, the rich clearly pay more, even 
proportionally more, but mainly for receipt of their own care. Unlike in universal 
coverage systems, which tend to require payments according to ability to pay and 
receipt according to need, in low coverage countries, payments and receipt of care are 
still very much linked and it can be misleading to analyze them separately. The 
measures of catastrophic payments and impoverishment that have been proposed and 
used to date are rather ad hoc and certainly do not have the sort of conceptual 
underpinnings that have been developed for progressivity measures. Further 
consideration should be given to the development of a conceptual basis for catastrophic 
health payments from which a measure can be derived. 
With respect to equity in access and use of medical care, again, a straightforward 
application of approaches based on the need principle, which requires those in equal 
need to be treated equally, runs into two problems. One is, as above, that a lot of care is 
simply allocated on the basis of market principles—you get what you pay for—and 
therefore the standard approach of using the average need-use relationship as the norm 
breaks down. Secondly, self-reported health measures appear much less reliable in low-
income/low-education settings and are therefore less appropriate for need 
standardization procedures. Given these problems, analysis is confined to examination 
of the distribution of health care with no standardization for need. Conclusions about 
equity can still possibly be drawn if there is prior knowledge of the distribution of need. 
Examination of the distribution of public health care is of additional interest since it 
reveals whether public spending dollars predominantly benefit the rich or the poor. This 
is integral to evaluation of the effectiveness of government anti-poverty policies. The 
Asian study shows that public spending on health care―despite being inequality-
reducing―does not predominantly reach the poor in most low-income countries. It was 
found to be most pro-poor in Malaysia, Thailand and Sri Lanka, three countries which 
seem to have achieved better targeted public care subsidies as a result of a combination 
of (near) universal public provision with limited user charges on the poor, 
geographically dispersed health services and facilities, a private sector offering an 
attractive alternative, and incomes that make demand for this alternative effective. 
With respect to inequalities in health itself, most studies hitherto have concentrated on 
objective measures like adult or child survival or nutrition because of presumed 
measurement biases in self-reported measures of health. This has generated a large and 
useful literature, ranging from descriptive over explanatory to evaluative; and such 
measures are clearly more appropriate the lower the level of development. But with 
rising levels of development, other aspects of health than nutrition and survival will gain 
importance and require measurement. Reports of weak, missing or even the ‘wrong’ 
gradients in self-reported measures of health and illness have generated skepticism 
concerning their usefulness and worries about strong and systematic reporting biases. 
The use of case vignettes has been suggested, both as a tool to testing for reporting 
tendencies, but also as a potential remedy to correct its biases. The evidence to date is 
still thin on the extent to which vignette-based modeling techniques will be able meet 
these promises.  
While most of the evidence reviewed in this paper concerns inequality measurement and 
explanation, it is obvious that there is an even more urgent need to complement this 28 
with evaluative evidence that is capable of demonstrating not only how inequality 
compares across time and place, or can be decomposed into (partial) associations with 
other inequalities, but also how it can be impacted upon by policy interventions.  This 
calls for well-controlled, possibly even experimental designs, which may give us harder 
evidence on the causes and consequences of health inequalities, but may come at the 
price of lower generalizability. Advancing health equity will require accumulating 
evidence from a multitude of micro studies on what interventions in which settings are 
effective in changing the distributions of health payments, health care and health. 
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